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I-BRIEF ISSUE & SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
The issue of this memorandum is whether a defendant can be charged with
offenses under two or more articles of the ICTR Statute based on the same act(s). If yes,
can s/he be convicted of two or more crimes based on the same act(s)?
International Tribunals, National Tribunals, as well as the ICTR rules and
precedent provide that the ICTR can charge defendants with offenses under two or more
articles of the ICTR Statute based on the same act(s). The precedent of these Tribunals
indicates that defendants can be convicted of two or more crimes based on the same
act(s). The recent ICTR decision in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case is contrary to the
great weight of international precedents including that of the ICTR. Should the
Prosecution choose to appeal the decision of the Trial Chamber, the joint Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY & ICTR is likely to overrule the decision.
II-FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Rwanda is composed primarily of two tribes, the Hutu (majority) and the Tutsi
(minority). Over the years, the two tribes have evolved into two separate and distinct
ethnic groups.1
In 1994, after years of violent clashes between the Tutsi army (the Rwandan
Patriotic Front, RPF) and the Hutu extremists, President Juvenal Habyarimana was
assassinated when his plane was shot down.2 The two tribes blamed each other for the
assassination. Almost simultaneously, Hutu soldiers began killing Tutsi civilians and
moderate Hutus. The Rwandan borders and transportation hubs were sealed off. The

1

Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, p.49 (1998)
[reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #1].
2

Id. at 53.
1

United Nations’ peacekeeping forces were not permitted to investigate.3 The killing of
the Tutsi population spread throughout the country.4 The responsibility of the genocide
against the Tutsis is shared among several categories of individuals: “the planners, the
‘military’ superiors and subordinates, and the unwilling accomplices.”5 The international
community, United Nations, and the Security Council reacted to the killings by adopting
Resolution 955 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.6
Upon its creation, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda incorporated a
set of Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These Rules permit the Tribunal to administer
the number and degree of crimes committed in Rwanda. The Tribunal is charged with
bringing to justice all persons including the planners, the military superiors and
subordinates, and the unwilling participants. The Rules provide the Tribunal the
authority to implement justice within a reasonable time and through judicially efficient
means. Joinder of Offenses, Rule 49, permits the Tribunal to consolidate the prosecution
of crimes. This allows for judicially efficient prosecutions, saving the Tribunal time,
resources and funds, while providing the defendants a fair trial. This memorandum will
discuss Joinder of Offenses at the Tribunal as well as at other national and international
tribunals.

3

Id. at 53-54.

4

Id. at 55. Radio broadcasters instructed the Hutus to complete the murders and “fill the grave.” Mass
graves were filled and bodies were dumped in the rivers.
5

Id.

6

Id. at 72. The ICTR was adopted by a vote of 13 nations approving, 1 opposing (Rwanda) and 1
abstention (China). Rwanda’s reasons for opposing the Tribunal were based on the composition and
structure of the Tribunal, failure of the Tribunal to give priority to genocide prosecutions, the prohibition of
the death penalty (which Rwandan national courts favor), and the failure to designate Rwanda as the seat of
the Rwanda Tribunal.
2

III-LEGAL DISCUSSION
A.

ICTY Statute

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) statute
permits the tribunal to charge and convict a person with two offenses/crimes for the same
or factually related conduct.7 The joinder of crimes/offenses is permissible under Rule 49
of the ICTY statute. Rule 49, Joinder of Crimes provides:
Two or more crimes may be joined in one indictment if the series of acts
committed together form the same transaction, and the said crimes were
committed by the same accused.8
The term “transaction” is defined in Rule 2 as:
A number of acts or omissions whether occurring as one event or a number of
events, at the same or different locations and being a part of a common scheme,
strategy or plan.9
The availability of joinder is critical in terms of judicial efficiency. It is also a due
process concern for the accused as it facilitates trial without undue delay as well as
eliminates the possibility of two or more trials for the same or related conduct under two
or more criminal statutes.
B.

ICTY Case Law

1. Case against Dusko Tadic
The ICTY’s first case was that of Dusko Tadic.10 Tadic was a Serb who
participated in the violent acts and effective destruction of the Muslim community in the

7

Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, vol.1, p. 205 (1995) [reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #2].
8

Id.

9

Id. at vol. 2, p. 46 [reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #3].

10

Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Justice, at 98-101 (1997)
3

Prijedor region of Yugoslavia.11 The German government arrested Tadic while living in
Munich and planned to prosecute him for his conduct in Prijedor. 12 The ICTY stepped
in and asked the German government to defer prosecution. The ICTY indicted Tadic and
in due time, the German government surrendered Tadic to the jurisdiction of the ICTY.13
The ICTY formally indicted Tadic for “thirty-four counts of Breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, and Crimes Against
Humanity, including murder, rape, and torture of Muslim men and women within and
outside the Omarska camp.”14 The indictment was based on the charges that Tadic pulled
four named Muslims heading to an assembly area and shot them. In another incident,
Tadic shot five men and beat them with wooden clubs. Tadic was also charged with the
“participation” in the castration and murder of one prison inmate as well as the torture
and murder of other inmates. Tadic was also charged with the rape of a female prison
inmate.
Tadic was found guilty of 11 of the 34 counts at the Trial Chamber. Tadic was
subsequently found guilty of nine additional charges by the Appeals Chamber when it
held that the conflict was international and thus the grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions apply (Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal, namely, willful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to

[reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #4].
11

Id. at 98-99.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 100-101.

14

Id.
4

body or health).15 For his role in the “attack, seizure, collection, segregation and forced
transfer of civilians to camps, calling-out of civilians, beatings and killings…against nonSerbs on the basis of religious and political discrimination,”16 Tadic was found guilty of a
Crime against Humanity. For his participation in the beatings and grievous violent acts
against six civilians,17 the Trial Chamber found Tadic guilty of Crimes against Humanity
and violation of the laws and customs of war. The Tribunal held that Tadic “intended for
discriminatory reasons to inflict severe damage to the victims’ physical and human
dignity.”18 This was a conviction under several statutes (several offenses) based on the
same act. For “intentionally assisting directly and substantially in the common purpose
of the group to inflict severe suffering upon”19 three different civilians who were not part
of the hostilities at the time, the Tribunal found Tadic guilty of Crimes against Humanity
and violations of the laws and customs of war. Once again, the Trial Chamber convicted
Tadic of violations of several statutes based on the same act(s). Thus in the Tadic trial,
its first, the ICTY held that defendants may be convicted under several statutes for the
same or similar conduct. This was subsequently was upheld in the Appeals Chamber.

15

Id. at 214. See also Dusko Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-94-1-Appeals Chamber Decision of July 15, 1999,
also found at www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm
[reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #5]
16

Id. at 275, Appendix D: Summary of the Tadic Verdict.

17

Id. at 276.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 276-277.
5

2.

The Case of Gorden Jelisic

Gorden Jelisic, also known as the “Serbian Adolph” was charged with 31
counts.20 His indictment covered crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and
customs of war and genocide for the murder, torture, detention, and abuse of Muslims
and Croats.21 Jelisic pled guilty to 30 counts, including charges of crimes against
humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. He pled not guilty to genocide
and was subsequently tried for genocide (the first person to be tried of genocide before
the ICTY).22 The ICTY held that in order for a defendant to be found guilty of genocide,
the prosecution must prove the defendant had a “clear knowledge” that he “was
participating in the …destruction… of a given group.”23 The Tribunal held that such
evidence includes “planning, inciting others, ordering the genocide or other types of
participation in the known genocide.”24 The Tribunal held that the prosecution did not
provide sufficient evidence that Jelisic had the intent to commit genocide beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Trial Chamber held that “the behavior of the accused appears to
indicate that, although he obviously singled out Muslims, he killed arbitrarily rather than
with the clear intention to destroy a group.”25 The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor
had not proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated by the dolus

20

Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. JL/P.I.S./441-E [reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #6].

21

Id.

22

Id. See also Maury D. Shenk, Carrie A. Rhoads & Amy Howe, International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 34 Int’l. Law. 683 (2000)
[reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #7].
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, para 108.
6

specialis of the crime of genocide. He was acquitted of the charge of genocide.26
Although Jelisic was not convicted of genocide for lack of sufficient evidence, his guilty
plea for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war based the
same or similar conduct was permitted. In acquitting Jelisic of genocide for the lack of
proof, the Trial Chamber never suggested that Jelisic could not simultaneously be held
guilty of genocide and the other crimes if there had been evidence of his intent to commit
genocide.
Whether through convictions or guilty pleas, the ICTY set the precedent for
convicting a defendant under two or more statutes for the same act/conduct. Since the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the ICTY have similarly worded statutes
and rules, and share the same Appeal Chamber, this is important jurisprudence for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to follow.
C.

ICTR Statute

Like the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) statute
permits the tribunal to charge and convict a person with more than one offense/crime for
the same or factually related conduct.27 The Tribunal may charge and convict a person
with violations of genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to

26

Id.

27

See Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, vol. 1, pp. 480-481 [reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2
@ TAB #1]. See also Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Rwanda Tribunal (as amended in January
and July 1996), Rule 49, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.2, reprinted in volume II. Rule 49 was recently re-adopted
at the Ninth Plenary Session of 3 November 2000. See www.ictr.org.

7

the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.28 The joinder of crimes/offenses
is permissible under Rule 49 of the ICTR statute.29 Rule 49, Joinder of Crimes provides:
Two or more crimes may be joined in one indictment if the series of acts
committed together form the same transaction, and the said crimes were
committed by the same accused.30
The availability of joinder is critical in terms of judicial efficiency. This is
particularly true in the case of the limited resources of the ICTR.31 It is also a due
process concern for the accused as it facilitates trial without undue delay32 as well as to
eliminate the possibility of two or more trials for the same or related conduct under two
or more criminal statutes.

28

See Jurisdiction of the ICTR at www.ictr.org.

29

Id.

30

Id. It is worth noting that Rule 49 of the ICTY and the ICTR is the same Rule, sharing the same
language.

31

Id.

32

Id

8

D.
1.

ICTR Case Law
The Akayesu Case

The ICTR found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty of genocide and crimes against
humanity, and direct and public incitement to commit genocide.33 Mr. Akayesu was the
bourgmestre of the Taba commune in the Prefecture of Gitarama in Rwanda.34 His
convictions arose out of massacres of ethnic Tutsis in the Taba commune, including
extermination, murder, torture, rape, sexual violence, killings of newborns and pregnant
women and the cutting of Achilles’ tendons to prevent escape of any Tutsis.35
The ICTR discussed the elements of incitement to genocide. The Tribunal held
that incitement need not be direct but can be implicit.36 A conviction for Incitement to
Genocide may be based on conduct that “plays skillfully on mob psychology by casting
suspicion on certain groups, by insinuating that they were responsible for economic or
other difficulties in order to create an atmosphere favorable to the perpetration of the
crime.”37
Also critical in this judgment is that the Tribunal held that the ICTR’s statute does
not establish a hierarchy of norms, but grants jurisdiction over separate offenses on equal

33

See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Indictment
[reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #8]. See also
www.un.org/ictr/english/judgment/akayesu.html
See Jose E. Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, 5 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp L. 359 (Spring 1999)
[reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #9].

34

Id.

35

See Jose E. Alvarez at p. 360.

36

See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Legal Findings [reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #8].

37

Id.
9

footing.38 The Tribunal held that offenses of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes each have different constituent elements and can lead to multiple convictions even
in relation to the same set of facts. The Tribunal applied the doctrine of “notional
plurality of offenses,” stating that although genocide and crimes against humanity are
separate offenses, convictions for both are possible arising out of the same action.39 The
Tribunal held that genocide is a “special intent” crime requiring a special intent to destroy
an individual targeted as a member of a group. The victim of the crime of genocide is the
group itself rather than the individual alone, and the intent can be inferred contextually
from the particular conduct.40 As for crimes against humanity, the Tribunal held that the
conduct must be committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population on discriminatory grounds.”41 It is worthy of note that the conduct
must be either widespread or systematic but not both for a conviction of violations of
crimes against humanity. The Tribunal did not convict Akayesu of complicity in
genocide. The Tribunal held that genocide and complicity in genocide are “mutually
exclusive by definition” and that Akayseu could not be convicted of both.42
It is worth noting that Akayesu was convicted of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes for the same or similar conduct. It is also critical to keep in
mind that although the Tribunal held that each statute has different elements, multiple

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.
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convictions even in relation to the same set of facts is permissible. This is in keeping
with the ICTY and international precedent and jurisprudence.
2. The Kambanda Case
Jean Kambanda, a former prime minister of Rwanda, pled guilty to all six counts
charged against him, arising out of mass killings of the Tutsi population. These counts
included genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity (for murder and
extermination).43
The Tribunal held that crimes against humanity are crimes that “shock the
collective conscience.”44 As for genocide, the Tribunal held that genocide required the
element of dolus specialis (special intent) that states the offense was committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a “national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.”45 It is
note worthy that the Tribunal permitted the guilty plea of the defendant for several
offenses and violation of various statutes for the same or similar conduct.
Thus, through convictions and guilty pleas, the ICTR has followed the ICTY and
international precedent for convicting defendants under two or more statutes for the same
act/conduct.
3. The Case of Kayishema & Ruzindana
Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana were indicted for committing genocide
and crimes against humanity. Kayishema was a former prefect of the Kibuye region. He

43

Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998), para40 [reproduced in accompanying
Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #10].

44

Id. para. 14.

45

Id. para. 16.
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was accused of personal responsibility for the massacre at the Catholic Church and Home
St. Jean complex in Kibuye town, the massacre at the stadium in Kibuye, and the
massacre at the church in Mubuga. Ruzindana, a businessman from Kigali and
Kayishema were accused of directing and personally participating in attacking and killing
thousands of persons seeking refuge in the area of Bisesero.46
The Tribunal found both men guilty of all charges of genocide. The Tribunal
acquitted the defendants of all charges of crimes against humanity. The tribunal held that
the charges overlapped with charges of genocide in this particular case.47 The Tribunal
held that the Prosecutor failed to show that any of the murders alleged was outside the
mass killing event, within each crime site. These murders formed a part of the greater
events occurring in Kibuye during the specific time. The Tribunal reasoned that “in the
peculiar factual scenario in the present case, the crimes of genocide, extermination and
murder overlap. Accordingly, there exists a concur d’ infractions par excellence with
regard to the three crimes within each of the four crime sites, that is to say these offenses
were the same in the present case.”48 In this case the ICTR did not convict the defendants
under several statutes for the same act/conduct.
The Trial Chamber held that crimes against humanity /inhumane acts were
included within the genocide charges based on murder and extermination. Trial Chamber
departed from the holding of the Akayesu case, where the defendant was found guilty of
both genocide and crimes against humanity for sexual violence. It also ignored the ICTY

46

Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T (May 21, 1999) [reproduced in accompanying
Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #11].

47

Id.

48

Id. para. 646-647.
12

precedent of the Tadic case, where the Trial Chamber reasoned that sexual violence could
be construed as a crime against humanity/inhumane act.49
The Trial Chamber did not convict the defendants of crimes against humanity
partially due to a lack of sufficient evidence. The trial Chamber seems to require very
specific and detailed evidence in order to convict for both crimes against humanity and
genocide based on the same act(s). The Prosecutor should attempt in future cases to
specify and provide with exceptional particularity evidence that support a conviction for
murder and sexual violence as both a genocide and crime against humanity.50
The holding of the Kayishema & Ruzindana case is a concerning development
since it indicates that the same offenses may not be charged under several statutes if they
are based on the same fact pattern. This is counter to the ICTR and ICTY Rule 49 (and
its interpretation) which permits joinder of offenses based on the same act/conduct. It is
also counter to the ICTY and ICTR precedent. This development raises the possibility
that defendants convicted in a similar situation to Kayishema and Ruzindana may walk
free without any reprimand for their conduct were the Appeal Chamber to throw out their
convictions. Double Jeopardy may not permit the Prosecutor to indict the defendants
again for their conduct.
E.

International Case Law
1.

Nuremberg

On August 8, 1945, the United Kingdom, United States, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and France, acting on behalf of the United Nations, established the

49

See memoranda to the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICTR by New England School of Law student Mary
Snyder, December 1999 [reproduced in accompanying Binder 1 of 2 @ TAB #12].

13

international Military Tribunal through the London Agreement.51 The Military Tribunal
provided for the trial of war criminals whose offences had no particular geographical
location. The constitution, jurisdiction and function of the Tribunal were defined in the
Charter annexed to the Agreement.52
Twenty-two defendants, the major war criminals, were indicted before the
Tribunal.53 They were indicted for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. They were also indicted for partaking in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiring to commit all of these crimes.54
The defendants were indicted under Article 6 of the Charter of the Agreement.55
The Tribunal stated that:
The Tribunal established by Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial
and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall
have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations,
committed any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a)

50

Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties;
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

Id.

51

Jordan J. Paust, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sharon A. Williams, Michael Scharf, Jimmy Gurule, Bruce
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(b)

War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of the civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners
of war or persons of the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c)

Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or persecution on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.56

This means that any leader, organizer, instigator and accomplice partaking in the
formulation or execution of the common plan or conspiracy to commit any of these
crimes may be liable for his/her conduct.57 It is critical that 17 of the defendants were
convicted for two or more of the counts in the indictments based on their conduct. Two
defendants were convicted of one count. Three defendants were found not guilty.58
An example of a multiple indictments and convictions for the same act(s) under
several crimes is that of defendant Goering. Defendant Goering was indicted on all four
counts of the Tribunal. Goering was the most prominent man in the Nazi regime until
1943. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force,
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and was a very close aide to Hitler regarding
military and political matters. Goering was convicted for violating Crimes against Peace
based on the various leadership positions he held, the conferences he attended, and his
public statements. The Tribunal held that he was the planner and prime mover in the
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See Paust et al. at 717-718.
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military and diplomatic preparation for the German war. He was convicted of War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity [multiple offenses based on the same/similar act(s)]
based on his complicity in the use of slave labor, the treatment of war prisoners,
spoliation of conquered territory, participation in conferences inciting war, and for the
direct order to resolve the Jewish question in the German sphere of Europe (persecution
and elimination of the Jewish population).59 The Goering case is precedent for all
international tribunals and an example of a defendant being indicted and convicted of
several offenses based on the same or similar act(s).
The Nuremberg Tribunal established the jurisprudence for the subsequent
international tribunals. A critical aspect of this jurisprudence is that a defendant may be
convicted of several offenses for the same act/conduct. A defendant in Nuremberg may
be convicted for murder, deportation and enslavement under the War Crimes and the
Crimes against Humanity provisions of the Charter.
2.

The Eichman Trial-Israel60

Israel tried ex-Nazi officer Adolph Eichman for his conduct and role in the "final
solution" in Germany and its occupied territory during World War II. Eichman "was the
person directly responsible for the execution of Hitler's orders for the 'final solution' of
the Jewish problem in Europe, i.e. the murder of every single Jew on whom the Nazis
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could lay their hands throughout the territories of Europe which they had occupied at that
time."61
Eichman was indicted of four counts of committing crimes against the Jewish
People (under Israeli national law). These indictments covered Eichman's role and
conduct in: 1) the death of millions of Jews by gassing and other means of extermination
at death camps; 2) deporting Jews to collection points for the purpose of executing the
"final solution;" 3) organizing the persecution of 20,000 Jews on the night of 9-10
November 1938 (The Night of Broken Glass), the social and economic boycott of the
Jews in Germany, mass arrest and deportation; and 4) the destruction of the Jewish
people through sterilization and interruption of pregnancies through artificial abortions.62
Eichman was additionally indicted of seven counts of crimes against humanity.
These indictments covered Eichman's conduct and role in: 1) causing the murder,
extermination, enslavement, starvation and deportation of the civilian Jewish population
in Germany and other Axis countries; 2) persecuting Jews on national, racial, religious
and political grounds; 3) establishing organizations to rob and steal personal property
from the Jewish population including the dying and dead Jews for later transportation to
Germany; 4) the deportation of over half a million Polish civilians from their places of
residence with intent to settle German families in those places; 5) the deportation of
residents of Yugoslavia with intent to settle German families in their places; 6) the
deportation of tens of thousands of gypsies to extermination camps for the purpose of
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murder; and 7) the deportation of approximately 100 children from Czechoslovakia to
Poland for the purpose of murder, and for being a member of the SS, SD, and the
Gestapo.63 Eichman was also indicted of one count of committing a war crime for
causing the ill treatment, deportation and murder of the Jewish inhabitants in Germany,
Axis countries and German occupied territories.64
The Israeli court convicted Eichman for committing crimes against the Jewish
People, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and of being a member of criminal
organizations.65 In relation to Eichman and the German military staff involved in the
"final solution," the court held that:
Everyone who had been "out into the picture," from a certain rank upwards, was
aware too that the machinery existed and was functioning, although not all of
them knew how each part of the machine operated, with what means, at what
pace, and where.
The campaign for extermination, therefore, was one single comprehensive act
which cannot be divided into acts or operations carried out by various people, at
various times and at different places. One team of people carried it out jointly, at
all times and in all places.66
The importance of the Eichman conviction is that the defendant was convicted for
violations of several statutes, both domestic and international, based on the same act or
conduct. The court held that all the various acts that were necessary to implement the
"final solution" were part of one act/conduct, rather than separate and independent
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conduct. This is critical to the ICTR as it provides precedent considering a specific grand
scheme act/conduct/or plan to be composed of several smaller acts and that defendants
indicted of committing the grand scheme/act may be convicted of violating several
statutes based on participating in the grand scheme.
This is a similar situation to the Kayishema and Ruzindana case where the court
held that three massacres constituted one act/conduct. The ICTR refused to convict the
defendants under two or more Articles of its statute. Instead the ICTR convicted the
defendants of Genocide only. Yet the Eichman court convicted the defendant under four
different statutes based on the same act/conduct.
3.

The Barbie Trial-France

Klaus Barbie was head of the Gestapo in Lyons, France from 1942-1944, during
wartime German occupation.67 He was convicted in absentia for war crimes and
sentenced to death. He was later discovered in Bolivia and after political changes in the
Bolivia government, which had protected him, he was expelled in 1983.68 In the mean
time, France instituted a new proceeding against Barbie for crimes against humanity
based on murder, torture, arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonment. He was held
responsible for the death of 4,342 persons, deportation of 7,591 Jews and arrest and
deportation of 14,311 members of the French Resistance.69 He was sent to French
Guiana. Upon arrival, he was arrested and extradited to France.
The national court permitted new indictments for crimes against humanity to be
instituted based on Barbie’s conduct. It did drop the war crimes charges and conviction
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because the statute of limitation had expired. After many legal appeals, the trial court,
Cour d’Assises du Rhone found Barbie guilty of all 340 counts of the seventeen crimes
against humanity.70 Although the conviction of war crimes had to be dropped due to the
statute of limitation, France was willing and able to try and convict Barbie again for the
international offense of crimes against humanity for the same act/conduct for which he
had earlier been convicted of, war crimes.
4.

American Law71

Defendants in the United States can be and are routinely charged with several
offenses based on the same act(s). These defendants are also routinely convicted for
several offenses based on the same act(s). United States Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide for the joinder of offenses.
a.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

In order for a defendant to be convicted for the same conduct/offenses under
several statutes, the offenses must have been joined in the indictment. United States’
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) allow such. Joinder of offenses is permitted
under FRCP 8 (a). The rule provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or
misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the
69

Id.

70

Id. See also Jean-Olivier Viout, The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against Humanity, 3 Hofstra L. &
Pol'y Symp. 155 (1999). The punishments contained in a decree rendered in felony cases shall be
extinguished after twenty years, counting from the date on which the decree became final. Id. at 156, n.9
citing The French Code of Criminal Procedure, Rothman & Co., South Hackensack, N.J. Title VIILimitation of the Punishment, Article 763 [reproduced in accompanying Binder 2 of 2 @ TAB #18].
71

For further and detailed study of joinder, please see memorandum to the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICTR
by New England School of Law student Andrea L. Varney, May 18, 1998. This section of my
memorandum has relied on the research of this student
[reproduced in accompanying Binder 2 of 2 @ TAB #19].
20

same act or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan.
United States courts have interpreted this Rule as that in order to join two or more
offenses in one indictment, “(1) the crimes must be of the same or similar character, (2)
the crimes must be based on the same act or transaction, or (3) the crimes must be based
on two or more transactions connected together constituting parts of a common scheme
or design.”72 United States courts have construed joinder “broadly to allow liberal
joinder and thereby enhance the efficiency of the judicial system.”73 United States
courts, as discussed in the following section have permitted convictions of several
offenses (under several statutes) based on the joinder elements. The ICTY and ICTR
statute is based on U.S. Law and thus U.S. court interpretation of its rules should provide
guidance to the ICTY and ICTR. It is worthy of note that the ICTR’s corresponding rule
is found in Rule 49 as discussed previously.74
b.

Criminal Case Law

United States courts have permitted Prosecutors to liberally apply FRCP 8 (a),
joinder, and charge defendants with several offenses based on the same act(s). The courts
have regularly convict defendants of several offenses based on the same act(s).
In doing so, United States courts developed three standards or tests for the use of
joinder per Rule 8 (a) in criminal cases. The first standard where joinder is permissible is
when the conduct or offense is “the same or of similar character.” The defendant in
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United States v. Cox was convicted of two firearms and six drug violations. At the
appeals court, he argued that “the two marijuana, the two firearms, and four drug offenses
involved three distinct and unrelated sets of activities and should have been tried
separately.”75 The Appeals Court disagreed. The court reasoned that first, the drug
charges, although they occurred on separate dates, were of the same or similar character
because they comprised “either possession with intent to distribute or conspiracy to
possess and distribute a controlled substance.”76 The court’s second reason for allowing
joinder was that although the firearms and drug violations may not be of the same or
similar character, the joinder of the two violations was permissible because they
comprised a common scheme or plan under FRCP 8 (a). The scheme or common plan
was to possess and distribute, especially since the drugs and firearms were discovered in
the defendant’s car at the same time.
The defendant in United States v. Hollis was convicted of ten counts, including
two for insurance fraud and two of mail fraud. The defendant argued that the offenses
should not be joined because each occurred on separate dates.77 The court disagreed
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reasoning that the two offenses were schemes of the “same or similar character.”78 The
court reasoned that in each offense, the defendant “defrauded the victim of money
through submission of falsified documents,”79 and thus it was proper and adequate to join
the offenses.
United States courts have interpreted the same or similar character test broadly.
In United States v. Valentine the defendant argued that joinder of weapons and cocaine
convictions was not proper because the offenses were not the same or similar in
character.80 The defendant was not permitted to carry firearms due to the nature of a
prior conviction.81 The defendant argued that the Prosecutor “failed to prove that he
possessed both the cocaine and the weapons as part of a common plan to sell cocaine for
profit.”82 The court held that the joinder was proper and that the Prosecutor had
demonstrated the presence of a common plan or scheme through circumstantial evidence
showing the guns and cocaine were discovered in the defendant’s kitchen at the same
time.83 The court continued that the scheme or common plan of the cocaine and the guns
was the “pursuit of unlawful activity.”84
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The second standard where joinder is permissible is when the conduct or offenses
are based on the “same act or transaction.” The defendant in United States v. Kinslow
was convicted of kidnapping, interstate transportation of a minor for sexual purposes, and
firearms and vehicle offenses.85 The defendant argued that the count charging him with
interstate transportation of a minor should not be joined because it did not establish a
scenario contemplated by FRCP 8 (a).86 The court disagreed and held that the joinder
under FRCP 8 (a) was permissible since “all of the counts in the indictment were based
on the same transaction and were part of a common plan.”87 The court continued that the
word “’transaction’ is a word of flexible meaning that may comprehend a series of related
occurrences.”88 In applying the law to facts, the court focused on the defendant’s
conduct. Within a 24-hour period, the defendant escaped prison, took a family hostage,
stole its car and traveled to California with its minor daughter.89
In United States v. Isaacs the defended was convicted of conspiracy, bribery,
Travel Act violations, mail fraud, tax evasion, and perjury.90 The defendant argued that
joinder of conspiracy, Travel Act, and mail fraud violations was nor permissible under
FRCP 8 (a). In responding, the court held that the term “’transaction’ contemplates a
series of many acts ‘depending not on so much as the immediateness of their connection
as upon their logical relationship.’”91 The court held that the offenses had a logical
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relationship sufficient to be joined.92 The offenses were all “connected with, or arose out
of, a common plan to corruptly influence the regulation of horse racing…the
commonality of proof suffices to establish that the offenses were ‘connected together’ for
the purpose of Rule 8 (a).”93
The third standard where joinder is permissible is when the offenses are based on
a “common scheme or plan.” In United States v. Gorecki the court permitted joinder of
drug and weapons charges against the defendant. The court reasoned that evidence at the
defendant’s house showed that he used the house for dealing cocaine, indeed that he had
purchased the house from a predecessor dealer for that purpose.94 The court continued
that “under these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that the firearm could have
been used as a vital part of a plan to possess and distribute drugs,”95 especially since both
the drugs and firearm were discovered at the same time and place. The court held that
joinder was permissible in this case because it was comported with the purpose of FRCP
8 (a), to promote judicial economy.96
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In United States v. Fortenberry the court permitted joinder of two car bombing
counts and one transporting an unregistered firearm on a commercial airliner count.97
The court interpreted joinder liberally and the term “transaction” broadly. Transaction
“may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the
immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.”98
United States Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Prosecutors’ application of the
rules as well as the courts interpretation has been broad. United States courts have
interpreted FRCP 8 (a) so that in order to join several offenses in one indictment, (1) the
crimes must be of the same or similar character, (2) the crimes must be based on the same
act or transaction, or (3) the crimes must be based on two or more transactions connected
together constituting parts of a common scheme or design. This liberal and broad
interpretation and application affords Prosecutors the ability to charge and the courts to
convict defendants for their crimes. The joinder of offenses allows for judicial economy
in the prosecution of crimes. Joinder acts to protect the defendants due process rights by
avoiding extended and expensive numerous trials for several offenses based on the same
act(s). Perhaps paramount of all the reasons, is the protection of the general publicsociety. Defendants at the trial court (and on appeal) are less likely to walk away free
due to a technical acquittal, since various other charges and convictions would still apply.
All of these arguments are part of a bigger debate. Joinder of offenses serves the public
policy of society.
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5.

South African Law

The law of South Africa is slightly different than American Criminal Law. A
person may be charged under several statutes for the same conduct/acts, unless the charge
is murder.99 If a person is charged with murder, no other charge may be joined.100 If the
conduct of the accused does not constitute offenses of the same type, and is unconnected
in circumstance, it is encouraged that the offenses not be joined under one indictment.101
6.

Nigerian Law

Nigerian Criminal Code permits joinder of crimes through judicial amendments.
Criminal Code sections 207-211 and specifically section 208 provides:
(1) Any court may alter or add to any charge or frame a new charge at any time
before judgment is pronounced.
(2) Every such alteration or addition or new charge shall be read and explained to
the accused and his plea thereto shall be taken.102
Section 208 applies to all courts in Nigeria. If the particular court decides that the
indictment is erroneous by reason of omissions, or that subsequent evidence provides for
a new or different offense, the court may add indictments for new offenses based on the
particular act(s).
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The Criminal Code also permits joinder of offenses and of defendants. Section
221103 of the Code states in part:
The following persons may be charged and tried together namely(c) persons accused of more than one offense of the same or similar character,
committed by them jointly;
(d) persons accused of different offenses committed in the course of the same
transaction.
The Code provides specifically for joinder of offenses where the defendants are indicted
for the same or similar/related offense. The Code does not address specifically the
situation where the defendant may be indicted and convicted for several offenses based
upon the same act(s). Yet the courts can amend an indictment to include additional
offenses. Thus a defendant may be charged with several offenses based on the same
act(s).
IV-CONCLUSION
The Nuremberg Tribunal established the precedent for subsequent international
tribunals. National precedents, such as United States law have followed closely. A
defendant in Nuremberg could be indicted and convicted for such acts as murder,
deportation and enslavement under several statutes within its Charter, such as War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. The ICTY and the ICTR have followed
Nuremberg and US law (especially since their Rule of Evidence is based on US law)
precedent of indictments and convictions under several statutes based on the same
conduct. The ICTR’s holding in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case is not consistent
with the Nuremberg, US, ICTY, or ICTR precedent. Although Nuremberg and the US
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cases are not mandatory authority over the ICTR, they are persuasive authority and a
precedent that has been followed by the ICTY and should be followed by the ICTR. This
is an important argument should the Prosecutor decide to appeal the Kayishema and
Ruzindana decision in the combined Appeal Chamber of the ICTY & ICTR. It is likely
that the combined ICTY & ICTR Appeals Chamber will follow its own as well as
international and national precedent by overruling the Kayishema and Ruzindana
decision.
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